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The Unique Price, as we observed, is a myth. Differences among prices
paid or received are almost universal. They arise for good cost reasons:
economies of lot size, differences in quality tolerances. They arise also, lard
at times, because of systematic price discrimination. They arise because larj
it is uneconomic—still another cost basis—to collect full, continuous in-
formation on prices. pri -
Forat least some, and possibly all, of these reasons the relative sm
movements of prices paid or received do not march together with fixed 1
cadence. The individual price relatives which constitute a price index of
almost invariably display some dispersion. This dispersion can arise proj
from differences in timing of purchases or sales, as well.1 An annual
average of the standard deviations of these monthly movements is re- havj
ported with each of our price series in Appendix C. The average value it
of this standard deviation for ammonia, for example, is 1.145: with a I
normal distribution some two-thirds of the individual ammonia prices of p
change each month by the average amount of the change in the index
2
(.403per cent in absolute value) ±1.145per cent. Measures of the o
dispersionof price movements are the subject of the present chapter. 1/(n
Thef
THE DETERMINANTS OF DISPERSION
Ifthere were a unique price, there would be a unique price change
from one date to the next. The converse is less simple. It would be
The
1Forexample, if a seller raises his price 5 per cent on January 1 but an irregu- searci
lar buyer does not purchase again until March, almost any interpolation or linking at the
procedure will give a different time profile to seller's than to buyer's price. chantDispersion of Price Movements 89
possible that there was no dispersion of movement even with dispersion
of prices, at a given time, because the differentials due to transportation
COStS, quality, lot size, etc., were stable. The dispersion in prices due to
incomplete knowledge, however, would lead to dispersion of price
movements. If seller A has a price 3 per cent higher than B today,
and yet makes sales because of incomplete price search by buyers, it
is unlikely that A and B will change prices simultaneously and in identi-
cal proportion, and impossible if they have incomplete knowledge of
all prices. Hence the theory of information, which is concerned with
dispersion of prices, is also relevant to the dispersion of price move-
ments. We now adapt it to this end.
The buyer who seeks the best price and supplier at time I will also
:es seek the best price at time (t + 1). He will search the market—the
potential suppliers—until the marginal gain from further search is no
larger than the cost. Since the cost of search is much the same for a
use large buyer and a small buyer, we expect the larger buyer to search
more intensiyely; therefore obtaining a lower price. We also expect the
price movements of large buyers to have less dispersion than those of
tive small buyers.2
The dispersion of prices is probably also a function of the number
dex of sellers. The reason one must say "probably" is that the intractable
rise problem of oligopoly appears. As the number of sellers increases from
iual one to many, one expects the probability of independent price be-
re- havior by the several sellers to rise—and in good part precisely because
Ilue it becomes more expensive to police any agreements on price.
th a The dispersion of prices is also dependent upon the rate of change
ices of prices in the market. If "the" conditions of supply and demand were
tdex 2Inperiod1let the prices asked by sellers be uniformly distributed between
the 0 and 1, so after n searches a buyer on average encounters a minimum price of
1/(n + 1), with variance n/(n+1)2(n + 2). (For a derivation, see G. Stigler,
The Organizationof Industry, Homewood,Ill., 1968, pp. 173—74.)
In period 2 let the distribution of asking prices shift upward by k, so the mean
rises by k and the variance is unchanged. The mean price change is k, and the




The variance of the price change is smaller, the larger n (the number of price
rregu- searches made by a buyer); and n is larger, the larger the buyer. If the prices
nking at the two dates are correlated, as usually they will be, the variance of the price
change is smaller the larger the correlation between prices at the two dates.
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to remain the same forever, buyers would gradually learn of the exjst
ence of lower prices (and sellers, of higher prices) and shift to the is:
lower price sellers (and sellers to higher price buyers) until dispersion
was eliminated. Changes in supply and demand conditions not only pre-
vent this asymptotic approach to complete knowledge but also reduce
the rewards from intensive search in any period.
whc
Some Empirical Investigations
For any one commodity, we expect the standard deviation of mdi-
themean (index) change tobe larger,
the larger the fluctuations in the (mean) price in the market. This
effect should be the same with both price increases and price decreases, knd
so we take the standard deviation of the index of prices u.,,asour measure
ofprice change. We accordingly fit to each industry's semiannual data cenl
an equation, fou
seth
with the expectation that b is positive. The standard deviations pertain
to the same period, e.g., isbased upon the six changes (from De- (md
cember 1964) in the first six months of 1965 and isbased upon the
fluctuations of the index during these six months.
The results strongly support the expectation: without exception the
regfession coefficients for the seventy commodities are positive. More-
over, the regression coefficients are, in general, highly significant: sixty
of the seventy t-ratios are in excess of two, and forty are in excess of
The elasticity. of the variance of price relatives with respect to the chai
variance of the price index is usually between .3 and .8.
We also investigate the comparative dispersion of price relatives in
different industries. It is then possible to introduce the average con-
centration ratio (C) for producers of the commodity and the number reiie
of price reporters (N). This latter variable is positively, but probably
loosely, related to the number of buyers of a commodity because we by
collected our data by presenting the same commodity list to each corn-
pany when requesting data. Here the regression equation takes the form
Here we expect that b > 0, c < 0, d> 0.
3Mostof the products with low f-ratios have only a small number of price
series. R
SDispersion of Price Movements 91
- Theregression equation derived from the data for all seventy products
is:




where the standard errors are given in parentheses under the regression
coefficients. The results are gratifyingly kind to our expectations:
(1) The larger the fluctuations in the rate of change of a price index,
i_ the larger the dispersion of the rates of change of the individual price
r, series (where the latter variable is an average of 119 monthly meas-
is ures). The fluctuations of average prices serve to render obsolete the
s, knowledge of prices in the market, and hence to lead to price dispersion.
re (2) The dispersion of price series is smaller, the higher the con-
La centration ratio for sellers (where C is the share in total sales of the
four largest producers in 1958). High concentration implies fewer
sellers, and a lesser task of obtaining information on market prices.
in (3) The dispersion is greater, the larger the number of price series
e- (measured at February 1962). The strength of the relationship is a little
he surprising. The number of price series in our sample is no doubt posi-
tively correlated with the true number of buyers, but this correlation
he may not be large. Still, the larger the number of buyers, the larger is the
informational problem in the market. The argument is symmetrical for
buyers and sellers.
of When the standard deviation of prices and of price index
he changes aremeasured over each year, and the various years are
treated as dummy variables, the regression coefficients are virtually the
in same as in the equation above. There is a modest tendency for the van-
-'n- ance of prices to rise over the early years of the period, but this probably
er reflects the rising number of price series available in these years.4
The equation, with the T's representing dummy variables for the years denoted
we by subscripts, becomes:
rn =.488cry,— .0048C + .0 162 N + .399 T1957 + .499
rm (.026) (.0013) (.0018) (.116) (.115)
+ .478 T1959 + .573 T1960 + .611 T1961 + .734
(.114) (.114) (.113) (.112)
+ .762 T1943+ .757 T1964 + .765 + .659 T1966
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TABLE7-1
The Effectof Antitrust Complaints Upon the Level of Prices
Average Price: Average Price:





after Complaint after Complaint a—
Direct Adjustedh Direct Adjusted5
Carbon steel sheet 7/64 100.00 100.04 99.73 99.72
Aluminum conductor cable 10/62 96.92 98.88 88.55 91.93
Gasoline (mid-Atlantic) 4/65 100.38 100.50 98.79 99.12
Rubber belting 3/59 100.05 99.64 100.69 99.42
Chlorine 12/64 96.77 96.79 95.42 95.96
Soda ash 12/64 100.00 99.95 (00.00 100.57
Tetracycline 8/61 95.90 n.a. 91.70 n.a.
Terramycin 8/61 93.23 n.a. 89.26
Meprobamate 1/60 94.73 n.a. 96.15 n.a.
a The average price for same number of months preceding the date of complaint = (00.
Adjusted prices are deflated by prices of other commodities of the same general category.
n.a. = data not available for adjustment.
PRICEBEHAVIOR AND ANTITRUST CASES
Although our choice of commodities for the present study was wholly
unrelated to the pro6lem of monopoly, it happens that nine of our
commodities were involved in antitrust cases with convictions for price-
fixing during the period of our study.5 These cases are listed in Ap-
pendix E, and the commodities are given in Table 7-1. The cases are
dated in the month when the complaint or indictment was filed.
We are obviously unequipped to discuss the economic merits of these
cases, but we can assess the effects of bringing the cases on the level
and the variance of prices. Does the bringing of the case lead to a re-
duction of prices? Two answers are given in Table 7-1. One is based
upon the mean price index in the three and nine months preceding the
Therewere also a few cases involvingmergers(Section 7, Clayton Act) but
theydo not raise any conventionalquestions about pricebehavior.We also omit
price-fixingcases involving a regionaloffense where we do not have data for a
regional price index.
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date of the charge (complaint or indictment) and the mean price in
the succeeding three and nine months. A second answer is obtained if
the pre- and post-complaint prices are adjusted for movements of simi-
lar commodities not involved in the case (using the price index of the
other commodities of the same general category).
It Theonly commodities whose prices fell appreciably after a case was
brought were the pharmaceutical drugs (in this area we had no satis-
ted
factorycomparable products whose prices might be used to adjust for
7, changes ingeneral market conditions) and aluminum cable. Perhaps
.93 eventhis degree of impact isall one can expect. Antitrust cases pay
much more attention to attempts to collude than to success in raising
.96 pflCes.
.57 Thevariance of movements of prices paid by buyers can be measured
in the behavior of both the price index and the individual buyers' prices.
a. Forthe price index, we compare the variance of the price index in the
nine months preceding and succeeding the beginning of the complaint,
corresponding to the longer period in which the level of the index has
gory.
beenstudied. The variance of the price relatives of the individual buyers'
prices is also calculated for nine month periods. We would expect both
TABLE7-2
TheEffectsof Antitrust Complaints upon the Variance of Price Index and







Commodity Before After Before After
Carbon steel sheet .156 .301 .135 1.656
Aluminum conductor cable 23.325 9.6 10 5.420 6.966
Gasoline (mid-Atlantic) I .590 .208 8.938 .384
Rubber belting .113 .430 .093 .193
Caustic soda .760 .313 3.107 2.588
Chlorine .292 .975 1.912 2.532
Tetracycline 16.073 24,663 7.563 15.074
Terramycin 26.586 3.535 16.479 18.622
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these variances to increase substantially after a complaint is brought
there had been collusion and if it was weakened or terminated when
the complaint was brought.° The results are given in Table 7-2.
The results are thoroughly puzzling. In four cases (gasoline, alumi-
num cable, terramycin, and meprobamate) there were large declines
the variance of the price index over time after the case was brought;
and in one case, tetracycline, a large increase. The variances of individ-
ual price relatives in the indexes were slightly more in keeping with
our expectations. Only one variance, gasoline, fell appreciably and sev-
eral rose modestly. The antitrust history appears to shed little light upon
price behavior in our sample.
6SeeG. Stigler, "A Theory of Oligopoly", Journal of Political Economy, Febru-
ary 1964, pp. 44—61.
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